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INTRODUCTION
In 1973, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,
held that until viability decisional authority regarding the outcome of a
pregnancy must vest in the pregnant woman.1 Relying on a long line of
cases recognizing that "zones of privacy ... exist under the Constitu-
tion," the Court characterized the abortion decision as one which is
private in nature, and located the right to terminate a pregnancy in the
"Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty.
The Court made clear that although fundamental, the right to
terminate a pregnancy is not absolute and that states have a compelling
interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the poten-
tiality of life. Recognizing that pregnancy is a dynamic process, the
Court held that these interests are not compelling from the outset of a
pregnancy, but rather increase in substantiality as a pregnancy pro-3
gresses. Constructing a trimester framework, the Court determined that
the state's interest in protecting health does not become compelling un-
til the second trimester, when the abortion procedure becomes
potentially more complex, and that its interest in protecting potential
life does not become compelling until the third trimester, when, ac-
cording to the Court, the fetus is capable of life outside of the womb.4
In securing this right of choice, the Roe Court spoke about all
women-it drew no distinctions based on age or capacity. However,
shortly after the decision, a number of states, seeking to deny young
women Roe's promise of reproductive autonomy, enacted laws requiring
minors to either obtain the consent of or give notice to their parents
before having an abortion.5
1. Roev.Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
2. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
3. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
4. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64. This trimester formulation was subsequently scuttled by
the Court in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992)
in favor of a more restrictive "undue burden" standard. Under this standard, a state
may regulate abortion from the time of conception forward in order to promote its
interest in the potentiality of life, so long as the regulation does not impose an
"undue burden" on the abortion right. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77. For a fuller dis-
cussion of Casey, see infra notes 66, 135-143 and accompanying text; see also Janet
Benshoof, The Pennsylvania Abortion Case, 9 TouRo L. REv. 217 (1993).
5. These states included: Idaho, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, Missouri, Utah, Nevada,
and South Carolina. See IDAHO CODE 18-609 (1973); ILL. COMP. STAT. Ch. 38
I81-54.4, 81-64.4 (1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.12.1(B)(1)-(3)
(Anderson 1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 112 § 12P (1990); Mo. REv. STAT. 188.028
(Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. 76-7-304 (1974); Nay. REv. STAT. 442.250
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The conflict over mandatory parental involvement has been one of
the most contentious issues in the struggle for reproductive rights. Em-
bodying a view of teenage incapacity and dependence, these laws assume
that young women will not exercise the right of choice wisely-that
they cannot be trusted to decide for themselves that they are not yet
ready for the challenges of motherhood.
Soon faced with challenges to these laws,6 the Supreme Court, in
considering the rights of young women, sought to reconcile an histori-
cally rooted vision of minors as dependent persons in need of protection
with a more contemporary understanding of minors as autonomous
individuals with adult-like claims to constitutional recognition.7 Build-
ing upon these twin themes of dependence and autonomy, the Court
both recognized and limited the reproductive rights of young women.
On the one hand, the Court indicated that like adult women, minors
have a constitutionally secured right of choice.' On the other hand,
(1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-30 (1973). When originally enacted, the Massa-
chusetts parental consent provision was designated § 12P. In 1977, it was
redesignated § 12S, although no substantive changes were made. For the sake of clar-
ity, this article will use the § 12S designation.
In theory, a notice requirement is arguably less intrusive than a consent re-
quirement, as it imposes an informational rather than an authorization qualification
on the abortion right. However, from the perspective of a minor whose parents are
opposed to abortion, this distinction is meaningless, as once they know about her
plan to terminate her pregnancy, they can prevent her from having an abortion, thus
making notice the functional equivalent of a denial of consent.
6. The first challenges were to laws from Missouri and Massachusetts. The Court con-
sidered the Missouri law in Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976), discussed infra at notes 63-77 and accompanying text. The Massa-
chusetts law was considered by the Court in two stages; initially, the Court remanded
the case, so the statute could be construed by the state's highest court. Respectively,
these decisions are Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti 1), discussed infra
at notes 78-93 and accompanying text, and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
(Bellotti l1), discussed infra at notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
Since these early decisions, the Court has considered the validity of parental in-
volvement laws on many other occasions. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292
(1997); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Ohio v. Ak-
ron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo., v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476 (1983); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th
Cir. 1985) affdsub nom. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987).
7. For a particularly thoughtful article about how this conflicting vision is reflected in
Supreme Court decisions concerning the rights of minors, 'see Janet L. Dolgin, The
Fate of Childhood- Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB.
L. REv. 345 (1997).
8. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 633. Danforth 428 U.S. at 74.
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based on concerns about "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and
the importance of the parental role in child rearing"9 the Court held
that unlike adult women, the decisional autonomy of minors could be
limited in favor of third parties.'1
Both reflecting and accommodating this tension, the Court in its
1979 Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II) decision constructed what, at first
glance, might appear to be a reasonable compromise-one that both
honors the reproductive autonomy of teens while purportedly protect-
ing them from the consequences of their immaturity." In deference to
historic constraints upon the free agency of minors, the Court con-
cluded that states may impose parental involvement requirements on
the abortion decision of teens. However, recognizing that for some
teens, mandated parental involvement would result in a loss of the right
to terminate a pregnancy, the Court held if a state wished to impose a
consent requirement, it had to provide minors with an alternative pro-
cedure that would allow them to bypass their parents and secure third
party permission for an abortion.'2
However, beneath the surface of what might appear to be a bal-
anced compromise between the recognition of rights and the perceived
need for protection lies a legal reality that destabilizes the Court's rea-
soning and calls into question the integrity of its parental bypass
compromise. Myopically focused on constitutional jurisprudence to
support its vision of minors as too immature and too subordinate to
parental authority to make their own reproductive decisions, the Court
9. Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 634.
10. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 633-38. In Danforth, the Court, striking down Missouri's
spousal consent requirement, unequivocally rejected the imposition of spousal limits
on an adult woman's decisional autonomy. 428 U.S. at 70-71. Subsequently in Ca-
sey, the Court struck down Pennsylvania's spousal notification rule. 505 U.S. at 895.
For a brief discussion about the Court's treatment of spousal involvement require-
ments, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
11. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
12. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-48. The Court has since held that a state must pro-
vide a bypass procedure if it enacts a law requiring that both parents receive notice of
their daughter's intent to terminate a pregnancy. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
415, 427, 450-55 (1990). But see Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352,
365-66 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1140 (1999) in which the court pro-
vides a novel re-interpretation of Hodgson, claiming that the Court did not strike
down the Minnesota notification law because it lacked a bypass provision, but be-
cause the notice requirement did not exempt abusive or absent parents, and was thus
overly broad. Camblos, 525 U.S. 1140 at 365-66. The Court has not directly ruled
on the question of whether a bypass is required in the case of a one parent notifica-
•tion law.
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ignored the fact that in the area of medical decision-making, particularly
with regards to pregnancy and other sensitive issues, minors possess sig-
nificant self-consent rights. While puzzling in its own right, this
omission is particularly baffling in light of the Roe Court's characteriza-
tion of abortion as a medical decision.
1 3
By examining the Court's failure to consider the allocation of
authority between parents and children in the critical realm of medical
decision making, this article exposes the irrationality of the Court's ac-
ceptance of limitations on the abortion rights of minors and reveals the
pronatalist thrust of the parental involvement decisions. 4 The article
begins by looking at how the Roe Court characterized abortion as a
medical decision, followed by a discussion about the medical decision-
making rights of minors. Rooted in this medical paradigm, the article
then turns to the parental involvement cases to examine the Court's
failure to consider the medical decision-making of minors when evalu-
ating the constitutionality of parental involvement laws as well as its
emerging concern for the rights of the unborn.
I. RoE AND THE "REASONABLE" PHYSICIAN
Emphasizing the physical and psychological detriments of forcing a
woman to carry to term, the Roe Court characterized abortion as
"inherently, and primarily, a medical decision... ,,5 The Court, al-
though locating ultimate decisional authority in the pregnant woman,
assumed that a woman's physician would play a central role in the deci-
sion-making process.16
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. See infira notes 15-16, 18, 21 and accompanying text.
14. In particular, in addition to Danforth and Bellotti I and II, this article will focus on
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Akron 497 U.S. 502 (1990); and Matheson, 450 U.S.
398 (1981). When read as a whole, these decisions reveal the Court's growing accep-
tance of the anti-abortion thrust of parental involvement laws.
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 166. This article does not endorse the Roe Court's medicalized ap-
proach to abortion. Rightfully so, Roe's characterization of abortion has been subject
to criticism on many grounds, including that it overemphasizes the role of the physi-
cian and ignores the dynamic relationship between reproductive control and gender
equity. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning fron the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261 (1992).
However, an understanding of Roe's characterization of abortion as a medical proce-
dure is essential to the central premise of this article-that minor abortion rights
cases reflect an anti-abortion animus rather than a concern for the well-being of
young women.
16. Some commentators have suggested that the opinion's emphasis on the role of the
doctor may reflect the fact that its author, Justice Harry Blackmun, had served as
2000]
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Both strands of the Court's medicalized thinking are evident in the
following central passage, which explains why the Court believes abor-
tion is deserving of constitutional protection:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Physical and mental health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress ... associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing
a child into a family already unable, psychologically and other-
wise to care for it. In other cases, the additional difficulties
and continuing stigma of unwanted motherhood may be in-
volved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible
physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
7
Focused on the medical attributes of abortion, the Court, at moments,
appeared to be more concerned with the rights of physicians to practice
medicine free from undue state interference than it was with the rights
of women to avoid unwanted maternity. For instance, in its summary,
the Court praised the fact that the decision "... . vindicates the right of
the physician to administer medical treatment according to his profes-
sional judgment .... "' while neglecting to mention that most critically
it vindicates the rights of women to make self-defining decisions about
the meaning and place of motherhood in their lives.
Roe's emphasis on the role and rights of physicians is profoundly
unsettling as it both diminishes the agency of women and the signifi-
cance of the non-medical aspects of the abortion decision. 9 There is,
however, a positive aspect to this medical paradigm. Given that abor-
tions are routinely performed in medical settings, the Court clearly
general counsel to the Mayo Clinic prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
17. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
18. Roe, 410 U.S. 165. There is a large measure of historic irony in the Court's celebra-
tion of the rights of physicians in light of the fact that restrictive abortion laws, such
as the one invalidated in Roe, resulted, in large measure, from a vigorous campaign by
nineteenth century physicians to outlaw abortion. For a discussion of this campaign,
see KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 14-39 (1984);
JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NA-
ToNAL POLIc, 1800-1900, 147-170 (1978).
19. See Siegel, supra note 15, for a critical assessment of Roe's medicalization of abortion.
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demonstrated its trust in practitioners to perform abortions as they
would any other medical procedure. Stating that abuses of discretion
should be subject to the "usual remedies" 20 for physician malfeasance,
rather than the historical criminal sanctions, the Court implicitly
"normalized" the performance of abortions, making them simply one
aspect of what a physician might be asked to do in the ordinary course
of caring for her patients.1
Had the Court, when considering the rights of teens in subsequent
abortion cases, continued to characterize abortion as a medical decision,
it might have been forced to engage in a very different analysis than it
did in light of the considerable medical self-consent rights of teens, par-
ticularly regarding sexual matters. As we shall see, however, the Court
moved away from this medical paradigm when considering the rights of
minors. To understand the significance of this shift, we first consider
the medical decision-making rights of teenagers.
II. TEENS AND THE MAKING OF MEDICAL DECISIONS
Grounded in the common law right of bodily integrity, a physi-
cian, other than in an emergency, is required to obtain the consent of
his or her patient before providing medical treatment. To be effective,
this consent must be informed. Put simply, this means the doctor must
provide the patient with sufficient information about risks and alterna-
tives so that he or she can make a meaningful decision about how to
proceed.22
When the patient is a minor, the long-standing rule is that consent
must be provided by a parent.23 This rule is predicated on a set of mutu-
ally reinforcing presumptions about the decisional incapacity of young
people and the integrity of the autonomous family. Minors, regardless
20. See Siegel, supra note 15 at 166.
21. Tragically, the recent spate of violence against abortion providers may make it in-
creasingly difficult for doctors who perform abortions to consider this service a
"routine" aspect of their practice. See Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu, Of Buffer
Zones and Broken Bones: Balancing Access to Abortion and Anti-Abortion Protesters'
First Amendment Rights in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 62 BROOK. L. Rav. 547,
548 n.4 (1996); Jack Hitt, Who Will Do Abortions Here? N.Y. TIMES, January 18,
1998, (Magazine), at 20.
22. See Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Be-
tween Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. Rav. 311, 312 (1994) (hereinafter
Wadlington, Medical Decision Making).
23. See Angela R. Holder, Disclosure and Consent Problems in Pediatrics, 16 LAw MED. &
HraLTH CARE 219, 219 (1988) [hereinafter Holder, Disclosure and Consent].
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of age or maturity, are presumed to lack the capacity to make informed
decisions about their own lives.21 Counterbalancing this "incapacity,"
parents are presumed to possess the wisdom and maturity their children
lack, and significantly, are presumed to "... have an identity of interest
with their minor children . . ." such that they will be guided by their
children's best interest when exercising their decisional authority.25
Rooted in the prevailing vision of the family as an integrated and har-
monious whole, this consent rule assumes that children do not exist
26apart from their parents.
These interlocking presumptions are, however, challenged by mul-
tiple exceptions to the basic rule of parental consent which, when
examined in their totality, seriously undercut the rule's primacy. As de-
veloped below, in some contexts, the authority of parents is limited
without a corresponding increase in the decisional authority of minors;
in others, decisional rights are transferred from parents to their children.
When examined as a whole, these exceptions clearly unsettle the domi-
nant vision of parents as hegemonic decision makers for their children.
24. This presumption has been challenged by a growing body of research suggesting that
teens, particularly those ages 14 and up, are able to make mature and informed deci-
sions. See, e.g., Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in
Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAw &
HUM. BEHAv. 129 (1992); Catherine C. Lewis, Minors' Competence to Consent to
Abortion, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 84 (1987); David G. Sherer, The Capacities of Minors to
Exercise Voluntariness in Medical Treatment Decisions, 15 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 431
(1991); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and
Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CILD DaV. 1587 (1982).
However, other researchers assert that the studies showing that minors are similar to
adults in their decision-making abilities have focused too narrowly on cognitive
abilities and have ignored the psychosocial factors that may impinge on decisional
ability. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decision-
making 37 VILLA. L. Rav. 1607 (1992); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman,
Maturity ofJudgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making
20 LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 249 (1996).
25. JOSEPHINE GITTI.R ET AL., ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING: THE
LAw AND PUBLIC POLICY 2, The Carnegie Council On Adolescent Development
(Working Paper June, 1990).
26. For an excellent analysis of how this vision is both reinforced and challenged by Su-
preme Court jurisprudence on the rights of minors, see generally Dolgin, supra note 7.
MINORS AS MEDICAL DECISION MAKERS
A. Exceptions that Limit Parental Decision-MakingAuthority
Without Shifting DecisionalAuthority to Minors
In this section, the article considers two situations in which paren-
tal decisional authority is limited in favor of third parties-the provision
of emergency care and cases of medical neglect. Although neither situa-
tion involves a shift of authority to minors, they are nonetheless worth
considering as they challenge the notion that parents have unbounded
authority over the medical care of their children.
1. Medical Emergencies
It is a well-established practice that a physician may treat a minor
without parental consent in the case of a medical emergency,2' and most
states now have statutes that specifically authorize such care.28 Although
sometimes explained by reference to the doctrine of implied consent,29
which assumes that under the circumstances a parent would consent if
contacted, the essential policy rationale behind this rule is that doctors
must be permitted to provide necessary medical care without fear of
liability.
30
Although clearly not giving teens independent decisional
authority,3' this rule is not without significance in consideration of the
status of teens as medical decision makers. First, by privileging the
health needs of minors over the decision-making authority of parents,
the rule implicitly recognizes that parental authority is not absolute, and
27. JAMES M. MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE
OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A LEcAL GUIDE, 50-54 (1986). Most of these
statutes define "emergency" in relatively broad terms to include not only life-
threatening conditions, but also "... those situations where a delay in treatment
would increase the risk to the patient's health, or treatment is necessary to alleviate
physical pain or discomfort." MoleussEY ET AL., supra, at 53.
28. See MoRIussEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 50-5 1.
29. See MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 50-51; Walter Wadlington, Minors and
Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OsGooDE HALL L.J. 115, 116 (1973)
[hereinafter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care].
30. See MoRussE ET AL., supra note 27, at 53; Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of
Autonomy: Should Minors Have a Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life Sustaining
Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. R'¢. 1, 19 (1996).
31. It is, however, possible that the minor could provide the necessary consent based
upon his or her status as a mature or emancipated minor. See MORaSSEY ET AL., su-
pra note 27, at 55. These concepts will be discussed below in the section on status-
based consent rights.
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that it must yield to other more immediate interests. Second, by its very
presence, this exception quietly recognizes that children exist as separate
beings in the world, and that parents may not always be present to
either prevent injury or tend to urgent needs. Without implying neglect,
it embodies an awareness that in the ordinary course of life, parents and
children are not inextricably bound together.
2. Medical Neglect
More directly limiting their authority, parents may be deprived of
control over their children's medical treatment in situations of medical
neglect. Here, a parent who is otherwise providing suitable care for a
child is considered not to be providing appropriate medical care, most
frequently by refusing to consent to care deemed necessary by the
child's physician. This parental inaction may be rooted in religious be-
liefs, and may include the use of spiritual healing.
Historically, courts were likely to intervene only if the parents' re-
fusal to consent to medical care posed a direct threat to the life of the
child.33 At least in part due to the expansion of child protection report-
ing laws and the broadening of actionable harms, however, the standard
is now somewhat more relaxed.3" In deciding if intervention is war-
ranted, courts generally balance a number of competing considerations,
such as the risk of harm to the child if treatment is withheld; the bene-
fits of treatment; the certainty of results; the express wishes of the child;
the religious beliefs of the parent; rights of parental privacy; and the best
interests of the child.35 If a finding of medical neglect is made, the court
usually appoints a guardian to act as a substitute decision maker with
respect to the treatment in question, without otherwise limiting the
rights of the parents.36
32. See generally Wadlington, supra note 22, at 314-23. Intervention in cases of medical
neglect is most commonly premised on a child protection statute. Most statutes now
specifically include medical neglect as a category of parental harm that will support
intervention into the family. Where it is not specifically included, the statutory defi-
nition of neglect is generally broad enough that it can be construed to include the
failure to provide medical care. See Gittler, supra note 25, at 4.
33. See Wadlington, supra note 22, at 314-23.
34. See Wadlington, supra note 22, at 314-323 and 331.
35. See Wadlington, supra note 22, at 331-34; for a discussion of how these factors may
be differentially weighted according to the circumstances, see Lisa Ann Hawkins,
Living-Will Statutes: A Minor Oversight, 78 VA. L. REv. 1581, 1605-06 (1992).
36. It is possible that the failure to provide medical care, could, as in other abuse and
neglect situations, result in the loss of all parental rights.
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As in cases of medical emergencies, this limitation on the consent
rights of parents does not shift decisional authority to minors nor does it
challenge the presumption about the decisional incapacity of teens.
However, by recognizing the possibility of parental neglect, it directly
challenges the presumption that parents always make good decisions
that promote the well-being of their children. By capturing the very real
possibility of divergent interests, and allowing for parental displacement,
this exception forces us to recognize that not all families function as in-
tegrated and harmonious units in which the basic needs of children are
37
met by their parents.
B. Exceptions That Simultaneously Limit Parental Decision-Making
Authority and Shift Decisional Authority to Minors
As developed in the above section, in cases of a medical emergency
or medical neglect, the decisional authority of parents is limited in favor
of either the physician or the state. The decision is not, however being
made by the minor-authority is still located in a third party. In this
section, the article examines rules that limit the authority of parents in
favor of vesting minors with decisional control over aspects of their own
medical care. First the article explores consent rules that recognize the
decisional ability of minors based upon their status; the article then ex-
plores treatment-based consent rules.
1. Status-Based Consent Rights
a. The Emancipated Minor
A teen who is legally emancipated can consent to his or her own
medical care.38 Under the common law of emancipation, a minor who is
"not living at home and is self supporting, is responsible for himself
economically and otherwise, and whose parents (voluntarily or
37. Of course, the possibility of intervention also creates the risk of unnecessary intrusion
into families based upon arbitrary definitions of good parenting. This tension has
been addressed in numerous articles, and is beyond the scope of our discussion. See,
e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something"About ChildAbuse: The Need to Narrow
the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y. 539 (1985).
38. GrTrLER, ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
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involuntarily) have surrendered their parental duties and rights," " may
be adjudicated an emancipated minor. This determination extinguishes
the reciprocal rights and responsibilities of the parent-child relationship,
and vests the child with adult-like rights, including the right to consent
to medical treatment. 0 Common law emancipation may also be
situationally determined. Minors who are married or in the armed
forces are generally considered emancipated without proof of actual
independence based on the incompatibility of their life circumstances
with parental control.4 '
Developed primarily as a vehicle by which parents could relinquish
control over their child,42 the common law of emancipation, although
clearly recognizing that minors may be fully independent of their par-
ents, was not motivated by a vision of minors as persons with claims to
self-determination. A number of states have enacted emancipation stat-
utes to respond to the need for a more teen-centered concept of
emancipation, and to bring coherence to the common law approach.43
Some of these statutes are general and others are limited in their
scope. Under a general emancipation statute, a minor petitions the
court "to be relieved of the disabilities of minority." In deciding
whether to grant the petition, most states consider the "best interest" of
the minor, often in combination with other factors such as whether he
or she is capable of conducting his or her own affairs 5 and/or is living
39. ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL IssuEs IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE
128 (2nd ed. 1985) [hereinafter HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES]. The author provides an in-
teresting discussion about minors who meet some but not all of the prongs of this
definition. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES at 129.
40. Depending on the circumstances, a minor may be deemed to be only partially eman-
cipated, and may therefore not be able to assert all of the rights associated with
complete emancipation. Regarding the difference between complete and partial
emancipation, see Sanford N. Katz et al., Emancipating Our Children-Coming ofLe-
galAge in America, 7 FAm.L.Q. 211, 215-19 (1973) [hereinafter Katz, Emancipating
our Children]. This article also provides a comprehensive analysis of the law of eman-
cipation.
41. See Katz, Emancipating our Children, supra note 40, at 217.
42. See Katz, Emancipating our Children, supra note 40; see also H. Jeffrey Gottesfeld,
Comment, The Uncertain Status of the Emancipated Minor Why We Need a Uniform
Statutory Emancipaton ofMinors Act (USEMA), 15 U.S.F. L. Rav. 473, 476 (1981).
43. See MORmSSEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 33; Wadlington, supra note 22, at 323;
Gottesfeld, supra note 42, at 477-79 (which also discusses the "first generation" of
emancipation statutes, which, according to the author, were enacted primarily to rec-
oncile the age of emancipation with the legal age of marriage).
44. Katz, supra note 40, at 232.
45. Id. at 236.
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separate and apart from his or her parents." If the petition is granted the
minor is afforded the rights and responsibilities of adulthood, including
the right of medical self-consent.47
In contrast, a limited emancipation statute grants an identified
class of minors relief from specific categorical limitations associated with
minority without the necessity of a court proceeding. Utilizing this ap-
proach, most states have enacted what are commonly referred to as
"medical emancipation" laws which give certain categories of minors
medical self-consent rights; for instance, most states allow a minor who
is married or in the armed forces to consent to his or her own medical
care. Minor parents are also considered emancipated in most states and
are able to consent to their own as well as to their children's health48
care. Many states also allow all minors above a certain age to consent
49to their own care.
The law of emancipation recognizes that minors may be suffi-
ciently independent of their parents, based either on age or on the
objective conditions of their lives, to warrant a transfer of decision-
making authority.0 Here, the presumed identity of interests between
parent and child disappears; it is no longer assumed that parental deci-
sion-making will promote the best interests of the minor.
Correspondingly, although doctrinally grounded in notions of inde-
pendence, rather than competence,5 emancipation, by freeing minors
from the usual age-based constraints, honors the ability of minors to
make appropriate life choices. By shifting decisional authority from par-
ents to teens, the law, of emancipation directly challenges the
46. See Gottesfeld, supra note 42, at 487-88.
47. However, some statutes give the court the authority to attach conditions to the grant
of emancipation, resulting in partial rather than complete emancipation. See Katz,
supra note 40, at 237.
48. See Holder, Disclosure and Consent, supra note 23, at 220. Consent rules, however,
may be different for unmarried fathers. See MoussEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 42-
43. Even if a state does not have a statute that expressly gives minor parents the right
to consent to the medical treatment of their children, they would have this authority
by virtue of their status as parents. See Momussy ET AL., supra note 27, at 41.
49. See Holder, supra note 39, at 128. As with most efforts at categorization, the lines
between approaches often blur, and it should be noted that age-based consent laws
are sometimes characterized as mature minor rather than limited emancipation stat-
utes. This is more likely to be the case if the statute also refers to the capacity of the
minor.
50. Of course, it is important to recognize that independence may be a response to pa-
rental neglect rather than a self-determined life course. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor
Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 239 (1992).
51. See Rosato, supra note 30, at 28.
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assumptions that parents are always the preferred decision makers and
that minors are incapable of meaningful self-definition.
b. The Mature Minor Rule
The mature minor rule is the other important status-based excep-
tion to the parental consent requirement. Developed mainly through
judicial decisions, this doctrine allows minors who are mature enough to
understand the risks and benefits of proposed medical treatment to give
consent.52 Unlike the law of emancipation which is premised on objec-
tive manifestations of independence, the mature minor rule directly
recognizes that teens may have the cognitive maturity to make informed
decisions about their own medical care.
[T]he legal principle now applied is that if a young person
(aged 14 or 15 years or older) understands the nature of pro-
posed treatment and its risks, if the physician believes that the
patient can give the same degree of informed consent as an
adult patient, and if the treatment does not involve very seri-
ous risks, the young person may validly consent to receiving
it.
53
52. See Holder, Disclosure and Consent, supra note 23, at 221. Developed in the early part
of this century, the mature minor rule pre-dates the development of an extensive
body of literature on the decision-making capacity of teens. Emerging over the last
thirty or so years, this literature supports the idea that teens possess the requisite ma-
turity to make important life decisions. See supra, note 24.
53. Angela R. Holder, Minors'Rights to Consent to Medical Care, 257 JAMA 3400 (1987)
[hereinafter Holder, Minors' Rights]. In general, the doctrine is less likely to be util-
ized if the treatment is highly risky, the underlying condition is very serious, or if the
treatment is undertaken for the benefit of a third party rather than the minor, such as
in the case of organ donation. See Holder, Minors' Rights, at 3401; see also Wadling-
ton, Minors and Health Care, supra note 29, at 119.
An important question that may arise is whether a doctor who treats a minor
based on his or her consent may disclose information about the treatment to the mi-
nor's parents. According to health law expert Angela Holder, the doctor is bound by
the usual rules of confidentiality. As she explains:
[I]t would seem that if the physician does not feel the need to obtain con-
sent of the parents to treat the child, he is by that decision assuring the
child that the normal physician-patient relationship that would obtain if he
were an adult has begun to apply.... By accepting the child as a responsi-
ble patient who has the right to consent to treatment, the physician has
implicitly accorded that child the normal rights of a patient within the pa-
tient-physician relationship.
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A few states have codified the mature minor rule. For example, in
Arkansas, "(a)ny unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to un-
derstand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or
medical treatment or procedures" may consent to his or her own medi-
cal care.
54
As with emancipation, the mature minor rule, by transferring deci-
sional authority from parents to minors, directly challenges" historic
understandings of capacity and the location of decision-making author-
ity. Embodying a dynamic vision of youth, this rule recognizes that
minority is not an indistinguishable phase stretching from infancy to
young adulthood, and that the allocation of authority between parents
and children must account for the increasing capacities of children as
they move through adolescence.
2. Treatment-Based Exceptions
Over the past few decades, most states, in response to increasingly
visible manifestations of teen sexual activity and drug and alcohol use,
have enacted a variety of "minor treatment" statutes that give minors
the authority to consent to specific kinds of medical care." These stat-
utes embody the recognition that if required to involve their parents to
obtain care related to sexual activity or other sensitive matters, minors
might delay or avoid seeking needed services. Accordingly, as a policy
matter, these laws privilege the health needs of minors over parental
claims of decisional authority.5 They allow minors to consent to preg-
nancy-related health care, excepting abortion57 and sterilization; family
Holder, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 39, at 143.
54. ARmc CODE ANN. § 20-9-602 (Michie 1987).
55. See generally Moxussa Er AL., supra note 27, at 49-86. Some minor treatment stat-
utes establish a threshold age of consent, commonly 12 or 14, ages which are dearly
well below the age of majority. For a state by state guide to minor treatment laws, see
PATRICIA DONOVAN, OUR DAUGHTERS' DEcISIONS: THE CONFLICT IN STATE LAW
ON ABORTION AND OTHER ISSUES (1992). See also MORRSSEY ET AL., supra note 27,
at 149-250.
56. Although these statutes give minors the right to consent to their own care, some al-
low, but generally do not require, the physician to notify the parents regarding the
course of treatment. See MORRIssEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 60-61. This, of course,
defeats the underlying purpose of the law, as minors may not seek treatment if they
know that their parents might find out about it.
57. This exception is, of course, the primary concern of this artide. It should be noted
that pregnancy-related care may require the making of medical decisions that involve
serious health consequences for either the pregnant woman or the child she is carry-
ing. Thus, for example, under these provisions, a teen could consent to surgical
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planning services, including contraception; the detection and treatment
of sexually-transmitted diseases;5 and services related to drug and alco-
hol dependency and abuse.59 Many states also allow minors to self-
consent to mental health services.60
Minor treatment statutes are similar to the status-based exceptions
in that they transfer decisional authority to teens. However, unlike the
status-bfised exceptions, these statutes appear to be grounded in consid-
erations of expediency6 1 rather than in a recognition of teenage maturity
or independence. Framed neutrally as public health measures, these laws
have attracted little controversy. Yet by recognizing the necessity of
giving minors control over sensitive medical decisions, this exception,
similar to that for medical neglect, directly recognizes that the interests
of parents and children may diverge, and that parental involvement may
interfere with the provision of essential medical care. These laws ac-
knowledge the reality of family conflict, and unsettle deeply-held beliefs
that parents are always the preferred decision makers for their children.
Interestingly, these laws are generally concerned with activities that
are historically more associated with adulthood than childhood. They
seem to implicitly recognize that intergenerational conflicts may arise as
children reach adolescence and begin to assert their autonomy by en-
gaging in activities that signal their approaching adulthood and
separation from their family of birth. By entrusting minors with the
authority to manage these sensitive and significant aspects of their lives,
these laws, although not directly premised on considerations of maturity
or independence, nonetheless acknowledge the ability of minors to re-
spond to the changing realities of their lives at moments in time when
their parents may not be able to do so.
procedures including, for example, fetal surgery to correct impairments or the per-
formance of a cesarean section. See infra note 112.
58. Most of these laws were enacted before the AIDS epidemic. For a discussion about
the different approaches states are taking with respect to whether minors can self-
consent to the testing for and treatment of HIV-infection, see generally William Ad-
ams, "But Do You Have To Tell My Parents?" The Dilemma for Minors Seeking HIV-
Testing and Treatment, 27 J. MARsHALL L. Rav. 493 (1994).
59. See MoaaussEa ET AL., supra note 27, at 44-50.
60. See Movmssr Lr AL., supra note 27, at 82-85.
61. See Wadlington, supra note 22, at 323.
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III. ABORTION AND THE PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT REQUIREMENT
This article began by looking at how the Roe Court characterized
abortion as a medical decision to be made within the context of the
patient-physician relationship. From there, the article looked generally
at medical consent rules for minors, examining parents' lack of he-
gemonic control over the medical treatment of their children. Cutting
deeply into the presumptions that underlie the parental consent re-
quirement, the law dearly acknowledges the decision-making capacity
of minors and the reality that parents do not always act in the best in-
terest of their children.
The critical question for consideration is how teen abortion fits
into this framework. Does the Court continue to characterize abortion
as a medical decision or does abortion take on other meanings? Does the
Court locate its analysis of parental involvement laws in the context of
medical consent rights for minors or does it draw upon other under-
standings of teen capacity and parental authority? With these
interrelated questions in mind, the article now turns to critical Supreme
Court decisions which, when taken as a whole, reveal how the Court's
partial, and arguably distorted, construction of reality divests young
women of true reproductive choice.62
A. Reasoning Within And Outside Of The Medical Paradigm
Three years after Roe, the Court faced challenges to parental con-
sent laws from Missouri63 and Massachusetts.6' Although the Court did
not uphold the constitutionality of either statute, these decisions lay the
foundation for its subsequent formulation of the parental "bypass" con-
struct.
62. Again, cases to be discussed include: Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (Casey); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502
(1990) (Akron); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (Matheson); .Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 650 (1979) (Bellotti I1); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976)
(Bellotti 1); and Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Danforth). For citations
to the other Supreme Court cases involving minor abortion statutes, see supra note 6.
63. See Danforth, 428 U.S. 52.
64. See Bellotti I, 428 U.S. 132.
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1. The Danforth Decision-Setting the Stage for the Selective
Burdening of the Abortion Right
Following Roe, the state of Missouri enacted a law for the "control
and regulation of abortions ... during all stages of pregnancy. ,5
Among other limitations, this law included both a parental and a
spousal consent requirement. Grounded in the reality of family relation-
ships, the Danforth Court was quick to invalidate the spousal consent
requirement. Recognizing that marital harmony cannot be achieved by
legislative fiat, the Court made clear that in the event of a disagreement,
the decision must belong to the pregnant woman, as she is the one who
"physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immedi-
ately affected by the pregnancy...., 66
Turning next to the parental consent requirement,67 the Danforth
Court began from the premise that like adult women, minors have a
constitutionally-protected right of choice, stating that "[c]onstitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one at-
tains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.,
68
65. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 56. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 55-57 for the legislative history
of this Act.
66. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71. Although our focus is not on spousal involvement re-
quirements, this aspect of the case is worth mentioning as it suggests an approach
that the Court could have taken with respect to parental involvement laws.
The Court revisited the issue of mandated spousal involvement in its 1992 Casey
decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-99. In considering whether women could be re-
quired to notify their husbands of their intended abortion, the Court demonstrated
notable sensitivity to the "millions of women in this country who are the victims of
regular physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands ...." Casey,
505 U.S. at 893. It recognized that such a requirement would put women at risk of
further harm, and was "likely to prevent a significant number of women from ob-
taining an abortion." Casey, 505 U.S. at 893. Chiding those unmindful of the reality
of domestic violence, the Court stated, "[wie must not blind ourselves to the fact that
the significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their
children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the
Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases." Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
Unfortunately, this sensitivity to the dangers of family violence disappeared
without a trace when the Court went on to consider and uphold the parental consent
provision of Pennsylvania's law. For an analysis of the inconsistencies in the Casey
Court's approach to spousal and parental involvement requirements, see Leonard
Bermen, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Supreme Neglect for Unemancipated Minors'
Abortion Rights, 37 How. LJ. 577 (1994).
67. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72.
68. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. With this statement, the Danforth Court simply assumes,
without explicitly stating it, that minors have a constitutional right to abortion. As a
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Having included minors in the essential Roe right, the Court considered
whether Missouri had the constitutional authority69 to make abortion
access conditional upon parental permission.
Remaining true to Roe's characterization of abortion as a medical
decision, the Court invalidated Missouri's consent requirement because
it vested a third party, namely a minor's parents, with" . . . an absolute,
and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his pa-
tient to terminate the patient's pregnancy."70 Reinforcing the locus of
the decision, the Court emphasized that giving parents the power "to
overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to
terminate the patient's pregnancy would neither strengthen the family
unit nor enhance parental authority or control."71
By continuing to characterize abortion as a medical decision, and
by again recognizing that family relationships are not enhanced by
mandated disclosure, the Court in Danforth appeared poised to extend
its thinking about spousal consent requirements to the parent-child
arena, and hold that regardless of age, the abortion decision belongs to
the pregnant woman. However, this was not to be. Although invalidat-
ing Missouri's parental consent law, the Court made clear that in doing
so it was not suggesting that all minors can give effective consent to an
abortion, 72 thereby signaling that it might accept a less intrusive law that
did not vest final decisional authority in parents.
In leaving the door open to a reformulated consent law, the Court
failed to consider the fact that at the time of the decision, teens in Mis-
souri were permitted to self-consent to "medical services for pregnancy
result, the Court did not specifically discuss whether the right of teens isfindamental,
although given the equation with adult rights, this would be a logical conclusion. See
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (discussing fundamental nature of the right of privacy).
69. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
70. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added). Again, the point here is not to endorse
the medical model of decision-making, but to highlight the flaws in the Courts rea-
soning as it fails to adhere to the medical paradigm that it constructed for reasoning
about abortion.
71. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). Interestingly, although not discussed by
the Court, neither would giving parents this power enhance their responsibility,
since, as a rule, parents of pregnant teens do not have any legal obligations to their
grandchildren, although parents may still have a duty to support their minor daugh-
ter despite the fact of her having become a parent. Where support has been
continued, it is usually based on a determination that the daughter is not fully eman-
cipated because of continued financial dependence on her parents. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Clay, 670 P.2d 31 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Doerrfeld v. Konz, 524 So.2d
1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Wulffv. Wulff, 500 N.W.2d 845 (Neb. 1993).
72. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
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(excluding abortion), venereal disease and drug abuse." 73 Emphasized by
the plaintiffs as the appropriate comparative framework, the Court did
not seek to understand why Missouri allowed minors to self-consent to
other important medical decisions, including those relating to preg-
nancy, while denying this right to teens seeking to abort.74
In failing to take the medical consent rights of teens into account,
the Court also failed to confront the fact that, as the ability to make
pregnancy-related medical decisions implicitly carries with it the right to
decide to become a mother, the Missouri statutory scheme linked deci-
sional authority to the intended pregnancy outcome. Accordingly,
young women were deemed capable of embracing but not avoiding
motherhood. Had the Court faced the inherent illogic of Missouri's
statutory scheme, it might have been forced to wonder whether in sub-
jecting the abortion decision to a parental consent requirement, while
granting decisional autonomy to teens carrying to term, Missouri was in
fact truly concerned with the welfare of teens and family integrity, as it
had claimed to the Court,75 or if it was instead seeking to limit the
abortion rights of teens.76
Had the Danforth Court considered the incongruity of Missouri's
allocation of medical decision-making rights, especially in relationship
to pregnancy, it would perhaps have been forced to recognize that this
selective burdening of the abortion right was inconsistent with Roe's
promise of decisional autonomy. In ignoring its own characterization of
abortion as a medical decision, and disregarding comparable decisional
rights, the Court left the door open for the acceptance of parental in-
volvement requirements, even as it invalidated Missouri's law.77
73. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 73 (referring to Mo. REy. STAT. §§ 431.061-431.063 (Supp.
1975)).
74. Plaintiffs also pointed out that "no other Missouri statute specifically requires the
additional consent of a minor's parent for medical or surgical treatment . . ." Dan-
firth, 428 U.S. at 73.
75. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-73.
76. Ironically, had the Court upheld the Missouri statute, this goal might have been
subverted as parents, once given control over their daughter's abortion decision,
would have the authority to force her to abort as well as to carry to term.
77. This theme will be elaborated in this section. Also, it should be noted that as it is the
most direct comparison, the legal status of teens intending to abort will be compared
to the legal status of teens intending to carry to term, rather than to those seeking to
make other kinds of medical decisions.
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2. The Bellotti I Decision-Abortion as Different
Because It Is Different
As discussed above, the Danforth Court, in ignoring plaintiffs' ar-
gument that the Missouri consent law should be considered in light of
the state's medical consent law, implicitly suggested that it was accept-
able for states to differentiate between teens seeking to abort and those
making other sensitive medical decisions, most notably related to preg-
nancy. The Court's failure to reason within this medical paradigm
suggests its discomfort with abortion as a pregnancy outcome at least
where minors are concerned. This suspicion is strengthened in light of
the Court's same-day Bellotti I decision.78
Unlike the Missouri law in Danforth, the Massachusetts consent
law gave minors the right to seek judicial permission for an abortion if
parental consent were denied. The Bellotti I Court concluded that until
the meaning of the statute was clear, it could not determine whether, as
plaintiffs claimed, the statute unduly burdened the abortion right or
CCcreate[d] some unanticipated interference with the doctor-patient rela-
tionship .... ,7" Accordingly, the Court held that the district court
should have abstained from hearing the matter until the meaning of the
statute was clear, and remanded the case so the statute could be
80
authoritatively construed by the Massachusetts courts.
In remanding the case, the Court indicated that its primary con-
cern was whether the statute vested parents with veto power over their
daughter's decision.8' The Court suggested that constitutional problems
78. Bellottil, 428 U.S. 132.
79. Bellotti , 428 U.S. at 148.
80. The Court ordered the district court to certify questions to the Supreme Judicial
Court (SJC) concerning the meaning of the statute and the "procedure it imposes."
Bellottil, 428 U.S. at 151.
Among other considerations, the certified questions addressed the standard that
both parents and judges were to use in deciding if an abortion was in a minor's best
interest, whether a judge could override the abortion decision of a mature minor, and
whether a minor could avoid her parents through application of the state's mature
minor rule. The text of these questions can be found at footnote 13 of the Bellotti II
decision, 443 U.S. at 630-31.
For the SJC's response to the certified questions, see Baird v. Attorney General,
360 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. 1977); for the district court's invalidation of the statute
based on the SJC's response, see Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1978). These decisions are discussed in J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Journey Through the
Courts: Minors, Abortion and the Quest for Reproductive Fairness, 10 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1, 5-8 (1998).
81. SeeBellotti, 428 U.S. at 145.
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might be avoided if, as urged by the defendants, the statute could be
interpreted to avoid giving parents this degree of authority. For exam-
ple, the statute could require parents to consider only their daughter's
best interest when deciding whether to grant consent, or could allow
mature minors to avoid their parents altogether under the state's com-
mon law mature minor rule. 2 As in Danforth, the Court in Bellotti I
indicated that a law which involved parents, but stopped short of lo-
cating final decisional authority in them, might not impermissibly
burden the abortion right of minors.83
In suggesting that it might uphold the statute if it were construed
to resolve the parental veto problem, the Court again failed to account
for the fact that, as in Missouri, Massachusetts minors had significant
medical consent rights.84 Once again, despite its continued understand-
ing of abortion as a medical decision, the Court did not locate its
reasoning in the realm of medical decision-making rights. In this case,
however, although profoundly unsatisfying in its superficiality, the
Bellotti I Court seemed to feel some obligation to acknowledge this
comparative realm.
Having discussed the unresolved constitutional issue as one of bur-
den, the Court, almost as an afterthought, addressed plaintiffs'
argument that the law was invalid because it created an "impermissible
distinction between the consent procedures applicable to minors in the
area of abortion, and the consent required in regard to other medical
procedures."85 As acknowledged by the Court, this issue had "come to
the fore" because Massachusetts had enacted a statute "dealing with
consent by minors to medical procedures other than abortion and ster-
ilization" during the pendancy of the challenge to its parental consent
law.
86
Prior to the enactment of this new statute, Massachusetts' primary
statutory exception to the parental consent requirement had been lim-
ited to medical emergencies; 7  this new statute granted minors
82. See Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 144. For an explanation of the mature minor rule, see the
section on status-based consent rights above and infra note 97.
83. See Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 145-48.
84. See infta notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
85. Bellotti , 428 U.S. at 148.
86. Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 148. This statute was enacted after the district court struck
down the state's abortion consent law in Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (1975).
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 112, § 12F (1998), amended by 1975 Mass. Acts § 564.
87. Prior to the 1975 changes physicians were exempt from liability for failing to obtain
parental consent "when delay in treatment will endanger the life, limb or mental
well-being of the patient," MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 112, § 12F (1998). Other statutes
also provided limited exceptions to the parental consent requirements. For example,
MINORS AS MEDICAL DECISION MAKERS
considerable medical self-consent rights based either upon their status or
the type of treatment sought. Accordingly, Massachusetts minors who
were married, widowed, divorced, a parent, a member of the armed
forces, or living independently, were now considered fully emancipated
for the purposes of consenting to their own medical care, excepting
abortion and sterilization." Additionally, and again excluding abortion
and sterilization, minors who were or believed themselves to be preg-
nant, as well as those seeking diagnosis or treatment for diseases deemed
dangerous to the public health, could now also consent to their own
89care.
As in Danforth, the Court in Bellotti I again faced a statutory
scheme that clearly differentiated between abortion and other medical
procedures. Most notably, as in Missouri, a Massachusetts minor could
make the decision to become a mother on her own, and then while
pregnant and thereafter, self-consent to her own medical care, while a
minor seeking to avoid motherhood could not effectuate this decision
without adult approval."
Despite this starkly contrasting treatment of teens based upon their
intended pregnancy outcome, the Court claimed, as with burden, that it
could not consider the issue of "impermissible distinction" until the
statute had been construed by the state courts. 9' However, the Court
was not facing subtle distinctions that demanded careful inquiry and
exposition. Regardless of whether, for example, the statute would be
interpreted to limit parents to consideration of their daughter's best
interest or to allow some minors to go directly to court, it was obvious
that in allowing motherhood but not its rejection to be a fully
autonomous choice, Massachusetts was differentiating between teens
intending to abort and those intending to carry to term. Even in the
absence of illuminating detail, had the Court wished, it certainly could
minors over the age of 12 could consent to the diagnosis and treatment of drug de-
pendency, excluding methadone maintenance therapy. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 112,
§ 12E (1998). Massachusetts also recognized the common law mature minor rule. See
infra note 97.
88. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 112, § 12F (1998) (also recognizing the right of minor
parents to consent to the medical care of their children). Unless "life or limb" were at
risk, minors were assured complete confidentiality. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 112, § 12F
(1998).
89. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 112, § 12F (1998). Although analytically insignificant, it
should be noted that I have chosen to characterize pregnancy as a medical condition
rather than as a status, because unlike the other emancipatory statuses, it is often both
an unintended and temporary event.
90. See infra note 113.
91. See Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 148-50.
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have invalidated the statute for impermissibly discriminating against a
fundamental right.
Implicit in the Bellotti I Court's avoidance of this issue is its accep-
tance of abortion as a stand-alone procedure that can be singled out for
more burdensome requirements than other medical choices. That this is
the silent but powerful holding of this case is made clear by the Court's
explanation of why it could not act without the insight of the state
court: "as we hold today in [Danforth] not all distinction between abor-
tion and other procedures is forbidden .... The constitutionality of such
distinction will depend upon its degree and the justification for it."92 As in-
dicated by this language, the differential treatment itself is no longer the
salient constitutional issue; accepted by the Court as a given, the ques-
tion has been subtly transformed to one of degree and justification.
Disturbingly silent, the Court offered no explanation as to how this
differential treatment can be tolerated under Roe. It did not attempt to
explain why teens who are deemed competent to make their own medi-
cal decisions lack decisional capacity with respect to this singular act.
Nor did it offer an explanation of why a pregnant teen can choose to
become a mother on her own, but cannot decide to avoid motherhood
without adult authorization, or why a teen mother is mature enough to
take charge of the medical care for herself and her child, but is not ma-
ture enough to make her own abortion decision. Certainly, if a teen is
too immature to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, one
must wonder whether she is ready to assume the responsibilities of
motherhood which, by necessity, entail a never-ending array of deci-
sions with life-shaping consequences for both herself and her child.
Perhaps, however, the Court was silent because there is no expla-
nation that would bear constitutional scrutiny. There is simply no
rational way to distinguish between the capacity of teens seeking to
abort and those seeking to carry to term or make other permitted medi-
cal decisions, or to explain how a teen could simultaneously be too
immature to choose to terminate a pregnancy, but mature enough to
92. Belltti, 428 U.S. at 148-50 (emphasis added). The Court's reliance on Danforth to
justify distinguishing between consent requirements for abortion and other proce-
dures is misplaced. The Danforth Court, in upholding record-keeping requirements
for abortions that were not imposed on other medical procedures, made clear that
this was acceptable only because these requirements did not have a "legally significant
impact or consequence on the abortion decision or on the physician-patient relation-
ship." Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81. In Bellotti I, in contrast, the distinction in consent
requirements goes to the heart of both the abortion decision, as minors are not per-
mitted to make this decision on their own, and the physician-patient relationship, as
the doctor cannot act based on the consent of his or her patient.
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choose motherhood with all of its attendant decisional responsibilities.93
This lack of a cogent explanation strongly suggests that the only salient
difference is the abortion itself.
Commonly regarded as insignificant when compared to the post-
remand Bellotti II decision, the Bellotti I decision is not as innocent and
unimportant as it seems. Although it avoids consideration of the merits
in a disarmingly circular manner, the decision conveys a powerful mes-
sage that paves the way for the Court's subsequent acceptance of
parental consent laws-abortion is different because it is different and
can therefore be treated differently.
B. Bellotti II-Constitutionalizing the Differential
Treatment ofAbortion
Following remand, the Court again considered the constitutional-
ity of the Massachusetts parental consent law, as construed by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).9' According to the SJC,
virtually all minors, regardless of maturity or circumstances, were re-
quired by the statute to seek parental consent, and were only entitled to
seek court authorization if parental permission was requested and de-
nied-there was no direct access to the Court.95 Significantly, the SJC
93. The point of this article is not to suggest extending consent or notice requirements,
but to highlight the irrationality of the treatment of abortion. Unlike the United
States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of California, in considering California's
parental consent law, grasped the inherent irrationality of such a statutory scheme.
Striking down the law, the Court stated:
Defendants' contention that the restrictions imposed by that statute upon
a minor's constitutionally protected right of privacy are necessary to pro-
tect the physical and emotional health'of a pregnant minor is undermined
by the circumstance that California law authorizes a minor, without pa-
rental consent, to obtain medical care and make other important decisions
in analogous contexts that pose at least equal or greater risks to the physi-
cal, emotional, and psychological health of a minor and her child as those
posed by the decision to terminate pregnancy.
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 826 (Cal. 1997). This is
an extremely thorough and well-reasoned decision that should be read by those inter-
ested in this subject.
94. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622.
95. See Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Mass. 1977). The only excep-
tions are for minors who are married, divorced or widowed minors and whose
parents are unavailable. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 630-31. A further discussion of
the statute, as construed by the SJC, can be found in Bellotti II at 630-33 and 644-
47.
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determined that the state's medical consent law providing status and
treatment-based self-consent rights for teens did not apply to abortion,
96
and furthermore, that the state's common law "mature-minor" rule was
no longer applicable to abortion, having been legislatively superseded by
the parental consent law.9' Had it ever been unclear, Bellotti II made it
authoritative-the Massachusetts statutory scheme for medical consent
rights discriminated between minors seeking to abort and those seeking
to make other sensitive medical decisions, including those involving
pregnancy.
In evaluating the Massachusetts statute, the Court blithely ob-
scured this reality. Maintaining that in enacting its parental consent law,
Massachusetts was simply seeking "to reconcile the constitutional right
of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to choose to terminate
her pregnancy... with the special interest of the State in encouraging an
unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in making
the important decision whether or not to bear a child,""8 the Court
96. See Baird, 360 N.E.2d at 298-300, discussed in Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 631. Regard-
ing this statute, see supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
97. See Baird, 360 N.E.2d at 284, discussed in Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 646-47 n.27. As
explained by the SJC, this common law rule actually permits doctors to provide
medical treatment to teens without parental involvement based on an assessment of
"the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the particular mi-
nor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves." Baird, 360 N.E.2d at
295. Moreover, "[j]udicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is ob-
tained, however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the
circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule .... Baird, 360
N.E.2d at 295.
98. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 639 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Focus-
ing on the rights side of the equation, it appears that the Court is equating the rights
of teens with those of adult women, which would mean that teens have a fundamen-
tal right to abortion. See supra, note 1. However, by then using a "special" as distinct
from the usual compelling state interest standard, one must wonder whether in fact
the Court is really making this equation.
The Court's benign characterization of why Massachusetts enacted this law ob-
scures the fact that it was sponsored by anti-choice legislators as part of an omnibus
anti-abortion legislative package to "provide protection for the life of the unborn
child." Otile McManus, May , Judge? BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, June 15, 1986, at
14. This is a very common pattern. According to a 1986 report of the American Civil
Liberties Reproductive Freedom Project, all of the post-Roe parental involvement
laws were initiated by anti-choice groups "which have as their primary goal ending all
abortions," and many of them were "introduced a part of omnibus anti-abortion
statutes designed to restrict or completely prohibit abortions." ACLU REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM PROJECT, PARENTAL NOTICE LAWS: THEIR CATASTROPHIC IMPACT ON
TEENAGERS' RIGHT To ABORTION 3 (1986) [hereinafter ACLU].
Most major professional, social service and medical groups who work directly
with teens are opposed to laws that mandate parental involvement. See ACLU, supra
[Vol. 7:65
MINORS AS MEDICAL DECISION MAKERS
failed to acknowledge that this state interest was actualized through a
consent requirement only when the decision was not to bear a child.
Narrowly focused on the decisional vulnerability and incapacity of
young women, and the authority of parents over their children," the
Court did not consider whether teens intending to abort, like teens in-
tending to carry to term, should be allowed to make their own
reproductive decisions.
Although not straying from this dominant vision of teen girls as
decisionally impaired, the Court in reviewing the statute did, however,
recognize that many parents hold "strong views on the subject of abor-
tion,"'0 ' and rather than providing their daughter with "mature advice
and emotional support,"'0 ' might seek to prevent her from going to
court or obtaining an abortion, thus, effectively exercising ultimate
control over her decision.
10 2
at 3 & 30 n.25. For example, in 1992, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of
the American Medical Association issued a report stating that while physicians should
encourage pregnant minors to involve their parents, involvement should not be re-
quired due both to the risk of abuse and the importance of privacy around health
care issues. This Council Report was adopted by the House of Delegates of the AMA
in 1992. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Mandatory Parental
Consent to Abortion, 269 JAMA 82 (1993).
99. In identifying these factors as the basis for limiting the rights of young women to
make the abortion decision, the Court invoked a number of earlier decisions in
which minors were accorded a different constitutional status than adults. Although
broadly supporting the proposition that minors can be treated differently than adults,
the Court's reliance on these cases is misplaced, as the conflictual configurations in
these cases are different from the direct parent-child conflict presented by the paren-
tal consent law. See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 637-39.
For example, the Court relied on several cases to support its position that the
rights of minors can be limited in order to enhance parental authority. However, in
the cited cases, the salient conflict was between the parent and the state, with no in-
dication of a dispute between the parent and the child; in these cases the Court
invoked parental authority to limit the intrusion of the state into an apparently har-
monious family, rather than to curtail a child's assertion of rights. See Bellotti II, 443
U.S. at 637-39 (citing WQisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding Amish
parents have right to educate children beyond the eighth grade at home)); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding parents have right to choose to send
their children to private rather than public school)). For further discussion, see J.
Shoshanna Ehrlich & Jamie Ann Sabino, A Minor's Right to Abortion-The Uncon-
stitutionality of Parental Participation in Bypass Hearings, 25 N. ENG. L. REv. 1185,
1189 n.20 (1991).
100. See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 647.
101. See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 641.
102. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 647.
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Attuned to the devastating impact of compelled maternity,' 3 the
Bellotti II Court, relying on Danforth, reiterated that the Constitution
does not support giving a third party ultimate control over "the decision
of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding the consent."'O' Accordingly, it
invalidated the statute on due process grounds because it "impos[ed] an
undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an abor-
tion."
10 5
Had the Court stopped with striking down the Massachusetts stat-
ute, its failure to reason within the broader context of medical decision-
making rights, despite its continued reference to abortion as a medical
decision, although perhaps depriving the opinion of a contextual rich-
ness, would have been understandable, especially since the blatant
discrimination between teens intending to abort and those intending to
carry to term would have been eliminated.'0 The Court, however, did
not stop with invalidating the Massachusetts statute. Having articulated
its belief in the necessity of parental guidance as a counterweight to teen
decisional incapacity, the Court went on to formulate what, in its view,
would constitute a constitutionally-acceptable parental consent law. As
set out in the decision, if a state wishes to require a minor to obtain pa-
rental permission before having an abortion, "it also must provide an
alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be
obtained;" 0 7 and, to avoid the risk of a parental veto, a minor must be
103. See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 642.
104. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643, quoting Danforth, 428 U.S at 74 (emphasis added). In
quoting Danforth, the Court carries forward the characterization of abortion as a
medical decision.
105. See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 647.
106. It is not entirely clear what the rights of teens intending to abort would have been
had the Court not gone on to make clear that a modified parental consent law would
withstand constitutional scrutiny. At a minimum, these teens would have had self-
consent rights under the state's common law mature minor rule; it is also possible
that the abortion exception under 12F would have been deemed invalid. See discus-
sion, supra note 86.
107. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643 (footnote omitted). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens maintained that this aspect of the decision was advisory in nature, as the
Court was no longer discussing an actual statute. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 656 &
n.4. (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
However, the Court has since made clear that Bellotti II is not advisory, but estab-
lishes the applicable legal standards against which consent laws must be evaluated.
See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511-14 (1990);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490 (1983); City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983).
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able to seek such permission without parental knowledge or involve-108
ment. In short, a minor must be allowed to bypass her parents
completely; court access cannot be made contingent upon a prior effort
to secure parental permission.
At first glance, the Court appears to have struck a reasonable com-
promise with this formulation of a model consent law. The construction
seems to both respect the reproductive rights of teens while simultane-
ously preserving the ability of states to protect an historically vulnerable
population. Reflecting the transitional nature of the teenage years,
young women are regarded both as autonomous rights-bearing indi-
viduals with unmediated claims to legal selfhood and as subordinate
members of a parent-centered family unit.
However, despite its surface appeal, the reasonableness of this
compromise is immediately called into doubt by the Court's selective
construction of adolescent reality. Ignoring both the emerging body of
social science literature on the decision making capacity of teens and the
rights of teens as medical decision makers, the Court's effort at com-
promise reveals its anti-abortion leanings.
Committed to its vision of teens as lacking the "ability to make
fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-
range consequences,"'09 the Court simply presumed incapacity without
considering any of the emerging social science research suggesting that
this long-standing assumption is profoundly flawed. For instance, one
influential study concluded that
As the Bellotti II Court did, this article will discuss the alternative procedure in
terms of a judicial hearing. However, it should be noted that the Court made clear
that states are not limited to this option, and that "much can be said for employing
procedures and a forum less formal than those associated with a court of general ju-
risdiction." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643 n.27.
108. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 647. The Court also set out other requirements'for a con-
stitutionally acceptable consent procedure. First, a minor must be given the
opportunity to show that she is mature enough to make her own decision, and if not
sufficiently mature, that an abortion is in her best interest. See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at
647-48. Second, the hearing and any appeals that follow must be "completed with
anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abor-
tion to be obtained." See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644. Interestingly, in constructing
this alternative procedure, the Court failed to consider that it was simply transferring
potential veto power from the minor's parents to the alternative decision-maker. This
point was not lost on the concurring Justices who characterized this aspect of the
Court's opinion as "particularly troubling." See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 655 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
109. See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 640.
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[i]n general, minors aged 14 were found to demonstrate a level
of competency equivalent to that of adults, according to four
standards of competency (evidence of choice, reasonable out-
come, rational reasons, and understanding), and for four
hypothetical dilemmas (diabetes, epilepsy, depression, and
enuresis)."'
Specific to the abortion context, another study concluded:
... the limited evidence available from studies of pregnancy
and contraceptive decision making suggests that minors may
equal adults in their competence to reason about decisions, and
that differences between minors and adults in decision-making
performance may be a result of the circumscribed role of ado-
lescents in the family and society."'
Rooted in an historically static vision of teens, the Court clearly felt no
obligation to re-examine its assumptions in light of these more contem-
porary understandings.
Dissociating itself from the realm of medical decision-making
rights, the Court ignored the fact that in Massachusetts, as in Missouri,
not all teens were regarded as similarly impaired. Disturbingly, the
Court failed to consider how a state could entrust minors to make some
but not other crucial medical decisions, in effect declaring that teens
lack the ability to make an informed decision not to become a mother,
while possessing the ability to make an informed choice to become a
mother. Moreover, as the decision not to become a mother cannot exist
apart from its effectuation through an abortion, this selective burdening
means that the reproductive decision making of a young woman seeking
to avoid maternity as well the effectuating medical choice are subject to
an adult approval requirement. However, a teen wishing to become a
mother enjoys full decisional autonomy over both her reproductive
choice and its effectuation through pregnancy-related medical care." 2
110. Weithorn, supra note 24, at 1595.
111. Lewis, supra note 24, at 87 (emphasis in original). Even critics of the studies con-
duding that the decision-making ability of minors parallels that of adults agree that
the Court lacked evidence for its belief "that adolescents are incompetent." William
Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority, Cognitive Development andAdolescent Le-
galRights, 44 AM. PSYCHOr 895, 897 (1989).
112. This care may include the making of medical decisions with profound and lasting
consequences for both the young women and the child she is carrying, such as
whether to be tested and possibly begin treatment for the AIDS virus, or whether to
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Certainly, if a young woman is capable of deciding to become a
mother, with all of the responsibility this decision entails, she is similarly
capable of deciding not to become a mother. As recognized by the
Bellotti II Court, the decision to become a mother carries with it pro-
found and lasting consequences as "the fact of having a child brings
with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of the
age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the termination of
the legal disabilities of minority."" 3 Given the significance of this deci-
sion, one could reasonably conclude that a state would have a particular
interest in ensuring that the decision to bring a child into the world is
fully informed.
The absurdity of linking decisional capacity to the pregnancy out-
come is highlighted by the fact that the same young woman might well
make both decisions during her teenage years. Certainly, most women,
adult or teen, when facing an unplanned pregnancy consider, at least
briefly, the implications of each choice for her life, perhaps moving back
and forth between options before settling on a final decision. Assume
for the moment that a young woman's initial decision, upon learning
she is pregnant, is to carry her pregnancy to term. Not only is she free to
make this decision on her own, but through this decision, she acquires
complete control over her own medical care both during pregnancy and
following the birth of her child. Now assume that part way through the
pregnancy, she changes her mind and decides to abort. With this
change of mind, her decisional capacity suddenly vanishes. Not only
must she secure adult permission to abort, she is divested of her medical
decision-making rights.
Now assume that rather than changing her mind, she carries to
term and is a mother with full medical decision-making rights for both
herself and her child. If she were to become pregnant again, and this
time decide to abort, she would suddenly be recast as vulnerable and in
undergo in utero surgery to correct a fetal condition. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 445 n.38 (1981).
113. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642. In addition to carrying adult-like responsibilities,
becoming a mother as a teenager has profound life consequences and is likely to
negatively impact a young woman's future educational and economic opportunities,
making it more likely that she will live in poverty. See RISKING THE FUTuRE: ADo-
LEScENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING 126-32 (Cheryl D. Hayes ed.,
1986) [hereinafter RISKING THE FUTURE]. But see KRISTEN LuKER, DuBIous CON-
CEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY (1996), in which the author
challenges the assumption that early childbearing causes poverty, arguing that poverty
is likely to contribute to the decision to bear a child at an early age, thus inverting the
traditional causal assumption.
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need of adult guidance to make this decision." 4 Of course, should she
again change her mind, her decisional ability would be fully restored.
Clearly, decisional capacity is not temporal and contingent, shifting
each time a young woman reassesses her pregnancy options. Yet this is
the implication of a statutory scheme that entrusts teens with the deci-
sion to bear a child but not to abort.
Similarly, it is also hard to make sense out of the contingent nature
of the parental role. In its Bellotti II decision, the Court alternated be-
tween themes of parental authority and parental nurturance and care in
order to justify a state-constructed role for parents in the abortion deci-
sion of their daughters. Regardless, however, of whether parental
consent laws are understood as giving expression to a "tradition of pa-
rental authority"" 5 or as embodying a nurturing function, it is not clear
why a role should be statutorily prescribed only where a young woman
decides to terminate a pregnancy. Certainly, if parents have an impor-
tant role to play in helping their daughter with the abortion decision, it
is clear they could also provide valuable support with respect to the deci-
sion to become a mother."' This is especially true in light of the
multiple medical decisions that pregnancy often entails, in contrast to
the singular nature of the abortion decision, and the fact that carrying
to term is generally riskier for a teenager than having an abortion."
7
Yet, as with decisional capacity, the Court viewed the desirability
of parental involvement through a partial lens. Honored as an inevitable
expression of rightfil authority and as an essential counterweight to teen
immaturity, the Court failed to address the fact that the statutory
scheme before it made selective use of parents-vesting them with cen-
tral importance where a young woman sought to terminate her
pregnancy, but casting them aside where the decision was to become a
mother. In failing to consider the logic of a statutory scheme that un-
evenly distributes medical decision-making rights to teens facing
"sensitive" decisions, or selectively excludes abortion as an autonomous
114. Although this would be the case under the Massachusetts statutory scheme, in other
states, once a mother, she would be able to consent to an abortion herself.
115. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 638.
116. This discussion is not in any way meant to disparage the crucial support that many
parents provide to their daughters who are faced with an unplanned pregnancy. The
concern here is with the element of compulsion. In a ideal world, all young women
would have parents who would respond to such an event in a loving and constructive
way. But unfortunately, as even the Court recognized, the world we live in is far from
ideal.
117. See ROBERT A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRAcEPVE TECHNOLOGY 481-82 (1994);
RISKUNG THE FUTURE, supra note 113, at 123-28.
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choice for otherwise medically-emancipated minors, the Court quietly,
perhaps even surreptitiously sanctioned the selective burdening of medi-
cal decision-making rights to disfavor abortion.
Given this differential treatment of abortion, a relatively undis-
cussed aspect of the Court's decision-its failure to consider the
plaintiffs' equal protection claim-assumes a great symbolic impor-
tance. Tucked into a footnote, following its exposition of the unduly
burdensome nature of the Massachusetts statute, the Court explained
that since ".... we have concluded that the statute is invalid for other
reasons, there is no need to consider this question. ""' At first glance, the
Court's decision not to evaluate whether the Massachusetts parental
consent law ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause appears entirely
reasonable. It is also consistent with basic jurisprudential principals not
to reconsider a statute through different lenses once it has been declared
unconstitutional.
Had the Court stopped with the invalidation of the Massachusetts
law on due process grounds, its failure to consider the equal protection
implications of a statutory scheme that classified minors according to
pregnancy outcome would have been entirely understandable. But its
avoidance of the issue assumes a different meaning in light of the fact
that the Court did not stop, but instead went on to formulate what, in
its view, would constitute a constitutionally-acceptable consent law. It is
in the shadow of this law that the Court's failure to address equal pro-
tection issues assumes profound significance.
In formulating this model consent law, the Court did not stop to
reconsider the issue of unlawful classification. Formulated against the
backdrop of a statutory scheme vesting minors, most notably those
seeking to carry to term, with significant medical decision-making
rights, the Court's acceptance of limitations on the rights of teens seek-
ing to abort clearly signals its approval of treating young women
differently based on their intended pregnancy outcome. Thus, although
claiming not to reach the equal protection issue, the Court, through the
back door, seems to have in fact located this discriminatory treatment
outside the reach of the Equal Protection Clause.
So considered, the Court's judicial bypass compromise hardly
seems to strike a reasonable balance between the reproductive rights of
young women and the state's interest in ensuring informed decision-
making through adult engagement. Since there is no reasoned way to
differentiate between classes of young women based on their intended
118. SeeBellottiI, 443 U.S. at 650 n.30.
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pregnancy outcome, the Court could not have engaged in the kind of
analysis demanded by this article. Thus, one must ask whether, in the
final analysis, the Bellotti II opinion is best understood as an expression
of the Court's discomfort with abortion.
That this may be the truest reading of the case is in fact suggested
by the text. Having previously clearly characterized abortion as a
medical decision to be made by a pregnant woman and her physician,
the Bellotti I Court introduces a new understanding of abortion. In
discussing the desirability of parental consultation, the Court explains
that a state may reasonably determine that "as a general proposition,...
such consultation is particularly desirable with respect to the abortion
decision-one that for some people raises profound moral and religious
concerns." 9 With abortion thus weighted with symbolic meaning, one
must ask whether it is because of these "profound moral and religious
concerns" that the Court is uneasy about allowing teens to make their
own abortion decisions-that these concerns serve to demarcate the
boundary between the decision to bear a child and the decision to abort.
Read this way, the decision, rather than embodying a concern for
minors and the integrity of families, can be understood as signaling a
shift in the Court's thinking about abortion. 20 No longer a medical
119. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added). Further suggesting that the Court is
backing away from its earlier understanding of abortion as a medical decision and its
reliance on doctors to provide informed guidance, the Court goes on to question the
ability of doctors, notably those at abortion clinics, to provide minors with "adequate
counsel and support." See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 641 (quoting the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Stewart in Danforth, 428 U.S. 91). The Court also raises the concern
that without the involvement of their parents, minors, unlike adult women, will not
be able to "distinguish the competent and ethical from those that are incompetent or
unethical." See Bellotti 1I, 443 U.S. at 641 n.21. Consistent with the rest of the
opinion, the Court does not consider the fact that minors choosing to continue a
pregnancy may be selecting their own doctors. Moreover, it fails to consider the fact
that minors who seek and obtain judicial consent for an abortion will also be doing
the same. This shift in attitude from Roe towards doctors who perform abortions is
troubling, and appears to be linked to the Court's apparent uneasiness with abortion,
at least where the pregnant woman desirous of making her own decision is a minor.
120. This shift in the Court's thinking about abortion is also evident in the Medicaid
funding cases. In these cases, the Court upheld the constitutionality of statutory
funding schemes that denied funding for abortions while paying the costs associated
with childbirth, maintaining that laws which encourage women to choose childbirth
over abortion are "rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of pro-
tecting potential life." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980), referencing Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1977). For a discussion of these cases see Carole A.
Corns, The Impact of Public Abortion Funding Decisions on Indigent Women: A Pro-
posal to Reform State Statutory and Constitutional Abortion Funding Provisions, 24
MicK. J.L. REFovum 371 (1991); Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was
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decision, abortion has been vested with multiple symbolic meanings
that a young woman is deemed incapable of deciphering on her own,
thus making the abortion decision different from other medical
decisions that teens may make on their own. First expressed in Bellotti
II, this reconceptualized understanding of abortion is thematically
repeated in subsequent decisions involving parental involvement laws.
C Forget Not the Unborn-Parental Involvement
Laws as Pronatalist Measures
Since Bellotti II, the Court has elaborated on the theme that abor-
tion is fraught with symbolic meaning and potentially grave
consequences. Giving concrete expression to the "profound moral and
religious concerns"21 mentioned by the Bellotti II Court, several subse-
quent decisions make clear that parental involvement laws embrace the
rights of the unborn.2 2 These decisions provide insight into how far the
Court has moved away from its original understanding of abortion as
"inherently, and primarily, a medical decision." ,la With this reconceptu-
alization of abortion it is finally clear why the Court has accepted the
differential treatment of teens based on their intended pregnancy out-
come.
Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae,
32 STA. L. REv. 1113 (1980); Note, Abortion, Medicaid, and the Constitution, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 120 (1979).
It is interesting to note that this pronatalist language first appears as a justifica-
tion for curtailing abortion rights in cases involving teens and poor women; it is not
until much later that this language makes its way into and influences the Court's
generalized reasoning about abortion. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 151-53 (1973); infra
notes 138-144 and accompanying text regarding the 1992 Casey decision. Certainly,
the governmental interest in protecting potential life is no greater when the pregnant
woman is either young or a recipient of public assistance. Perhaps the explanation for
this early curtailment lies in the fact that teens and poor women both lack a signifi-
cant political voice and have been portrayed as irresponsible reproducers with less of a
claim to self-determination than other women.
121. Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 640.
122. This, of course, is entirely consistent with the objectives of the proponents of parental
involvement laws (for a discussion of these objectives, see note 98). These decisions
include: Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); and H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398 (1981).
123. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
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Shortly after Bellotti II, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a Utah parental consent statute. In H.L. v. Matheson,'24 the Court
ominously characterized abortion as a decision that has "potentially
traumatic and permanent consequences. "  The Court also claimed that
the "medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion
are serious and can be lasting,"12 and are more serious in minors than
adults.'27
Underscoring its message that abortion is fraught with danger, the
Court, in response to plaintiffs claim that "the constitutionality of the
statute is undermined because Utah allows a pregnant minor to consent
to other medical procedures without formal notice to her parents if she
carries to term,"'12' declared that the "state's interests in full-term preg-
nancies are sufficiently different to justify the line drawn by the statutes.
If the pregnant girl elects to carry her child to term, the medical deci-
sions ... entail few-perhaps none-of the potentially grave emotional
and psychological consequences of the decision to abort."129 The Court
124. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398. This case is significant because it starkly reveals the Court's
thinking about the dangers of abortion. It is less significant as a precedent because the
plaintiff apparently lacked standing to challenge the law as applied to minors who
were either mature or could show that notification was not in their best interest, since
she failed to allege either as a basis for avoiding notification. See 450 U.S. at 405-07.
See also 450 U.S. at 427-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412.
126. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411. See infra note 129 regarding Justice Marshall's response
to this statement in his dissent.
127. See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411, n.25. According to two experts in the field, the
Court, in making these assertions
used selective vision in its perception of psychological effects of abortion.
Contrary to empirical reality, the Court has assumed that adolescents are
vulnerable to grave trauma in abortions decisions .... At the same time...
the Court has ignored the possibility of psychological harm as a result of
intrusions upon privacy and of decisions to carry a pregnancy to term....
In one of the few instances in which any citation of psychological literature
was made, the citation was completely irrelevant. In H.L. v. Matheson
(1981), Chief Justice Burger cited a report of unsystematic psychoanalytic
impressions of adolescents who carried their pregnancies to term as foun-
dation for the conclusion that the psychological effects of abortion on
minors are "markedly more severe" than the effects on adults.
Gary B. Melton & Nancy Felipe Russo, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological Perspectives
on Public Policy, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 70 (1987) (citations omitted).
128. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412.
129. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412-13 (citations omitted). As remarked by Justice Marshall
in dissent, this statement is baffling. Certainly, women carrying to term may face de-
cisions with profound "emotional and psychological consequences" such as whether
to be tested and possibly treated for the AIDS virus, or to undergo diagnostic tests,
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thus acknowledged the ability of a pregnant girl to "elect" to continue
her pregnancy. Motherhood is seen as a natural, perhaps inevitable, out-
come of pregnancy. Although lacking any reliable support for its claim,
the Court depicted abortion as a choice weighted with devastating
emotional and psychological consequences."'
Having distorted the decisional framework, the Court revealed its
identification with a "pro-life" perspective. Unconcerned that "the re-
quirement of notice to parents may inhibit some minors from seeking
abortions," 131 the Court, relying on the Medicaid funding decisions,
made clear that laws which "encourag[e] childbirth except in the most
urgent circumstances" are "rationally related to the legitimate govern-
mental objective of protecting potential life." 32 Unmasked is the
pronatalist function of parental involvement laws; they are not intended
to promote competent decision making, they are intended to stop
young women from choosing abortion, hence their distinction from
other medical consent laws.
133
The true significance of the "moral and religious concerns" identi-
fied initially by the Bellotti II Court is thus reveal6d. No longer simply
abstract preoccupations, these concerns serve to animate the interest of
such as amniocentesis, or to submit to in utero surgery to correct fetal anomalies. Al-
though perhaps not routine in nature, these decisions suggest the possible range of
difficult choices that pregnant women may face, many of which may involve the bal-
ancing of risks to herself and the child she is carrying. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 445
n.38.
130. A considerable body of research makes dear that abortion is safer for teens than car-
rying to term, especially when done early in pregnancy, and that psychological harm
is not an associated risk. Still other research documents the profound detriment that
having an unwanted child has on the life of both the mother and the child. See, e.g.,
Interdivisional Committee on Adolescent Abortion, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological
and Legal Issues, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 72 (1987); Catherine C. Lewis, Minors' Compe-
tence to Consent to Abortion, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 84 (1987); Jeanne Marecek, Counseling
Clients with Problem Pregnancies, 42 AM. PSYCHOL 89 (1987); Gary B. Melton &
Nancy Felipe Russo, AdolescentAbortion: Psychological Perspectives on Public Policy, 42
AM. PSYCHOL. 69 (1987); Gary B. Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion:
Unintended Effects, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 79 (1987). Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological
Factors in Abortion: A Review, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 1194 (1992); Marvin Eisen & Gail
L. Zeliman, Factors Predicting Pregnancy Resolution Decision Satisfaction of Unmarried
Adolescents, 145 J. OF GENETIC PSYCHOL. 231 (1984); HATCHER, supra note 117 at
481-82; RPsING THE FUTURE, supra note 117 at 278.
131. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413.
132. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) and
referencing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977).
133. It is hard to imagine that the government is really interested in encouraging teens
(and poor women) to have babies. The absurdity of this purported rationale only
serves to underscore the antipathy toward abortion that animates these decisions.
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the state in the potentiality of life. Without so much as a nod to Roe, the
Matheson Court makes clear that the rights of young women can be
curtailed in the name of the unborn.
Almost a decade after its decision in Matheson, the Court, in Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Healih,34 again revealed how far it had
moved from its original conception of abortion as primarily a medical
decision, at least where the decision-maker is a minor. Casting abortion
as a philosophical choice, the Court explained why parental involve-
ment is important:
We believe ... that the legislature acted in a rational man-
ner .... A free and enlightened society may decide that each
of its members should attain a clearer, more tolerant under-
standing of the profound philosophical choices confronted by a
woman who is considering whether to seek an abortion. Her
decision will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity, and
the origins of the other human life that lie within the embryo.
The State is entitled to assume that, for most of its people, the
beginnings of that understanding will be within the family,
• , . .. . 135
societys most intimate association.
The message is clear: left to her own devices, a young woman may
fail to fully consider the "origins of the human life that lie within the
embryo." It is this potential life, rather than what it means to become a
134. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). The primary issue before the Court was whether the bypass
procedure provided for by Ohio law met the requirements of Bellotti II. Despite the
fact that among other obstacles, minors were faced with a confusing choice of plead-
ing forms and required to provide clear and convincing evidence of maturity or best
interest, the Court held that the bypass satisfied Bellotti I 497 U.S. at 515-17.
Another issue was whether the requirement that notice be provided by the phy-
sician who is to perform the abortion rather than by another qualified individual was
unduly burdensome. In an ironic twist, having previously questioned the ability of
doctors to provide minors with proper counsel and support, the Court then lauded
the fact that physicians are in the best position to help parents deal with this
"problem in a mature and balanced way." 497 U.S. at 519, sutpra note 119. Given
these conflicting depictions of physicians, one cannot help but wonder whether the
Court is drawing on multiple images of doctors in order to suit its own objectives.
135. Akron, 497 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added). On the same day it issued the decision in
Akron, the Court issued its decision in Hodgson v. Minnesota. Here, yet again, the
Court upheld a parental notification law, despite the fact that the state allowed preg-
nant minors to self-consent to all other pregnancy-related medical care. As in Bellotti
I, the Court noted that an important function of notice was that, among other con-
siderations, it gave parents an opportunity to discuss the "religious or moral
implications" of abortion with their daughter. Hodgson, 497 U.S. 417, 448 (1990).
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mother, that is of primary concern. A teen's own "destiny and personal
dignity" does not ensure decisional autonomy as her right to self-
determination must be balanced against the interests of potential life-
an interest that the state may seek to protect through the intermediary
of a young woman's parents. No longer cast as a medical decision, the
Court does not even need to feign consideration of the generally biased
allocation of medical decision-making rights; only the decision to end a
potential life-not the decision to bring one into the world-is imbued
with a significance that a teen cannot comprehend on her own.
In the cases discussed so far, the Court, although revealing the pro-
natalist function of parental involvement laws, did not seek to reconcile
its decisions with Roe's mandate that the interests of the unborn cannot
be considered until the third trimester.3 6 By characterizing abortion as a
philosophical rather than a medical decision and by allowing the rights
of the fetus to determine state abortion policy with respect to young
women, these decisions erode the meaning of Roe. Hiding behind a
distorted vision of teen decisional capacity and family intimacy, the
Court makes a mockery of Roe's promise that the autonomy of women
cannot be compromised in the name of the unborn.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the last of the cases under consid-
eration, the Court caught up with itself.17 Here, in considering the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act (ACT)," the
Court's preoccupation with the rights of the unborn was not limited to
its consideration of the parental involvement provision of this Act, but
instead infused the entire decision. Although affirming a woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy before viability, the Court, claiming that Roe
undervalued the state's interest in the potentiality of life, abandoned
Rods trimester formula in favor of a more restrictive undue burden
test.'39 As explained by the Court:
We reject the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade. To
promote the State's profound interest in potential life,
throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure
that the woman's choice is informed, and measures designed
136. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973). The same is true with respect to the
Medicaid funding cases which allow limits on the rights of women in the interest of
encouraging childbirth. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
137. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-77.
138. The provisions of this Act included a spousal notification requirement, a parental
consent requirement, and an informed consent requirement with a 24-hour waiting
period. See Casey, 505 U.S at 881, 887, 899.
139. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73.
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to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion.140
Given this blossoming of support for the rights of the unborn, it
should come as no surprise that the Court upheld the provision of the
Act requiring minors to obtain the consent of a parent before having an
abortion (subject to the availability of an alternative consent mecha-
nism). However, the decision adds a new twist-not only can a state
require parental consent, it can demand that this consent be "informed"
in accordance with the informed consent provisions of the Act that the
Court also upheld. 4' Accordingly, parents are made subject to the same
requirements a woman seeking an abortion would face, including the
mandatory 24-hour waiting period.14
Challenged as unduly intrusive, the Court made clear that in-
formed consent rules "have particular force with respect to minors: the
waiting period, for example, may provide the parent or parents of a
pregnant young woman with the opportunity to ... discuss the conse-
quences of her decision in the context of the values and moral or
religious principles of their family."14  However, the requirement that
the consent be informed does much more than this. The state is both
seeking to persuade minors to act within the existing belief system of
their families (as with the "ordinary' parental involvement law), and to
impact parental views-to convince parents that childbirth is preferable
to abortion, so that they may, in turn, influence their daughter.
By heightening the consent requirement, the state now has a
double opportunity to convince young women that "there are
philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to
140. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
141. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87. In upholding the Act's informed consent provision,
the Court overruled two earlier decisions to the extent that they invalidated informed
consent requirements. (The earlier decisions are Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). See 505 U.S., at 881-83.
According to the Act, for consent to be informed, a woman, at least 24 hours
before the scheduled abortion, must, in addition to being told about the nature of the
procedure and the risks, be told about the availability of state-published materials
"describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for child-
birth, information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which
provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion." 505 U.S. at 881.
142. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
143. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900.
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bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term..." 14 If
enfolding teens in the existing value structure of their families is not
sufficient to deter abortion, the value structure itself can be challenged
through the intermediary of an informed consent requirement.
Following Casey, not only are minors now selectively burdened when
the decision is to abort rather than to carry to term, parents are likewise
burdened. Although not required to participate in their daughter's
decision to become a mother, parents can be compelled to submit to the
state's persuasive apparatus before consenting to her abortion.
CONCLUSION
Having extolled the persuasive function of the heightened consent
requirement, the Casey Court simply stopped. It did not even seek to
justify the parental involvement requirement in terms of its benefit to
young women other than that it provides the opportunity to "discuss
the consequences of her decision in the context of the values and moral
or religious principles of their family."145 Casey clearly shows how the
Court's growing preoccupation with the righs of the fetus has moved to
center stage. Revealed as the animating force behind the Court's sup-
port for parental involvement requirements, it is now easier to
understand why the Court shifted away from the medical paradigm set
out in Roe.
Had the Court continued to reason within this medical paradigm,
it could not have avoided confronting the reality that teens enjoy con-
siderable autonomy when it comes to their own health care, especially
when matters of a "sensitive" nature are at issue. Faced with this reality,
the Court would then have been compelled to ask and answer the kinds
of questions set out earlier in this article-namely how a state can dis-
tinguish between teens based on their intended pregnancy outcome,
granting decisional autonomy to those carrying a pregnancy to term
while casting those seeking to abort as vulnerable and in need of guid-
ance.
However, with Bellotti II, the Court's understanding of abortion
shifted. It no longer spoke of abortion as primarily a medical decision,
but as one imbued with "profound moral and religious concerns.""'
Whether or not this shift was a deliberate strategy by the Court to avoid
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
145. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900 (emphasis added).
146. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 622, 640 (1979).
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confronting the discriminatory allocation of medical decision-making
rights is unclear; nonetheless, the shift in paradigm was, from the
Court's perspective, a success. Draped in symbolic meaning, abortion
can no longer be compared to other decisions that a teen may be called
upon to make, such as whether she is ready to embrace motherhood and
the adult responsibilities, including full medical autonomy, that this
status entails.
As revealed in Casey, the decision to abort is a decision that the
state may seek to undo in furtherance of its interest in persuading
women to choose motherhood over abortion. As further revealed, pa-
rental involvement laws nobly serve this function, thereby enabling the
Court to reason about them within a self-contained and created frame-
work that ignores the true status of teens as possessors of meaningful
medical decision-making rights. t
